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This paper examines the e⁄ects of the distribution of unemployment
by duration on the level of unemployment. It explores one central as-
sumption that is observed empirically: when the share of long-term
(short-term) unemployed increases, the unemployment rate increases
(decreases). By embodying this assumption in a standard equilibrium
unemployment model we characterize the joint behavior of unemploy-
ment and the distribution of unemployment by duration. In the the-
oretical part of the paper an extension of the standard equilibrium
unemployment model is provided where the average job ￿nding prob-
ability depends on the distribution of unemployment by duration. In
the empirical section we estimate a panel data model for 16 OECD
countries to test the implications of the theoretical model. The main
results are: First, in a steady state equilibrium the ￿ ow rates are larger,
the larger the share of short-term unemployed. Second, out of steady
state the unemployment rate increases (decreases) with the share of
long-term (short-term) unemployed. Third, the larger the duration
dependent job ￿nding probabilities the larger the share of short term
unemployed. Fourth, panel estimates for 16 OECD countries provide
robust and signi￿cant evidence that an increase in the share of short-
term (long-term) unemployment decreases (increases) the unemploy-
ment rate. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports our hypotheses
whereby (a) the reemployment probability decreases with an increasing
spell of unemployment and (b) average exit rates have international dif-
ferences. Hence, the di⁄erent experiences with unemployment on both
sides of the Atlantic can be explained by observed aggregated duration
dependence and di⁄erences in the average exit rate.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines the e⁄ects of the distribution of unemployment by
duration on the level of unemployment. It explores one central assump-
tion that is observed empirically: when the share of long-term (short-term)
unemployed increases, the unemployment rate increases (decreases). By em-
bodying this assumption into a standard equilibrium unemployment model
we characterize the joint behavior of unemployment and the distribution of
unemployment by duration.
In the US, the shares of short-term and long-term unemployed have
been roughly stable since the seventies. In addition, the ratio of long-term
to short-term unemployed is small compared to other OECD countries. In
contrast to this, the share of long-term unemployed has increased while the
share of short-term unemployed has decreased in the same period for most
of the European countries.1 For example, the average share of short-term
(long-term) unemployed between 1980 and 2003 is 71% (8%) in the USA
and 8% (64%) in Italy.2 The average rate of unemployment for this period
is 6.4% for the USA and 15.7% for Italy.
Explanations for these developments relate both to the supply side and
demand side. The supply side argument is often based on human capital
theory. A stagnation or a loss of human capital occurs when an individual is
unemployed.3 The reemployment probability for those who are out of work
for a long time decreases if ￿rms ￿nd a su¢ cient number of job applicants
with an appropriate level of skills among the short-term unemployed. A
demand side driven explanation is given by Blanchard and Diamond (1994).
They provide a model in which the exit rate from unemployment is a de-
creasing function of unemployment duration. The central assumption in this
framework is that ￿rms hire the applicant who has been unemployed for the
least amount of time.
In this paper we provide an extension of the standard equilibrium unem-
ployment model that allows for unemployment duration dependent job ￿nd-
ing probabilities. That is, the average job ￿nding probability depends not
only on the market tightness but also on the distribution of unemployment
by duration. This means that the more people are long-term unemployed,
the lower the average job ￿nding rate. For a given job destruction rate the
unemployment rate increases with the share of long-term unemployed. In
the empirical part of the paper we apply di⁄erent panel estimators on data
for 16 OECD countries to test the implications of the theoretical model.
1See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) for a discussion of these facts.
2The share of short-term unemployed comprises of people with a spell of unemployment
of up to three months. A person is long-term unemployed if he or she is out of work for
more than one year.
3Pissarides (1992), for example, uses a search model to show the unemployment e⁄ects,
if workers lose skills when unemployed.
2The approach allows us to analyze three central questions: First, is there
international evidence for a stable negative relationship between the dura-
tion of unemployment and the reemployment probability? Second, does a
collapse in the reemployment probabilities from unemployment at all dura-
tions of unemployment account for the increase in the share of long-term
unemployed? Third, in contrast to the second question, has the exit rate
from unemployment declined only for the long-term unemployed, while the
other exit rates have remained constant?
The main results are: First, in a steady state equilibrium the ￿ ow rates
are larger, the larger the share of short-term unemployed. In addition, the
risk of becoming long-term unemployed is smaller, but the probability of
remaining in long-term unemployment is larger. Second, out of steady state
the unemployment rate increases (decreases) with the share of long-term
(short-term) unemployed. Third, the larger the duration dependent job ￿nd-
ing probabilities the larger the share of short term unemployed. In addition,
the smaller the duration dependent job ￿nding probabilities, the more the
unemployment rate is driven by long-term unemployment. Fourth, panel es-
timates for 16 OECD countries provide robust and signi￿cant evidence that
an increase in the share of short-term (long-term) unemployment decreases
(increases) the unemployment rate. Therefore, the empirical evidence un-
derlines our hypotheses whereby (a) the reemployment probability decreases
with an increasing spell of unemployment and (b) average exit rates exhibit
cross country di⁄erences. Hence, the di⁄erent experiences with unemploy-
ment in North America, Australia, and Japan on the one hand, and Europe
on the other hand, can be explained by observed aggregated duration de-
pendence and di⁄erences in the average exit rate.
The paper is organized as follows. A discussion of duration dependence
and (unobserved) heterogeneity is given in the next section. In section 3
we provide an extension of the standard equilibrium unemployment model
that allows for unemployment duration dependent job ￿nding probabilities.
Section 4 describes the data and the econometric model and reports the
estimation results. Considerations with respect to long-term unemployment
policy are provided in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Duration Dependence and (Unobserved) Het-
erogeneity
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the distribution of unemployment
by duration a⁄ects the level of the unemployment rate. However, to discus
policy aspects in section 5 it is useful to take a closer look at the causes
of long-term unemployment. With regard to the causes of the international
di⁄erences in long-term unemployment disunity exists. In many studies
it has been argued that the experience with long-term unemployment in
3Europe can be explained by an exit rate from unemployment that decreases
with the spell of unemployment. This is what is called duration dependence.
In theoretical models the causes for duration dependence, and even its
de￿nitions, are varied. Lockwood (1991) provides a model for duration
dependence that arises because of sorting. That is, duration dependence
is present due to worker heterogeneity (known to the potential employer).
Pissarides (1992) assumes in his model that the long-term unemployed lose
some of their skills. He derives the implications of this for job creation.
Hence, the results are driven by changes in job creation, not by duration
dependence itself. In contrast to this, Coles and Masters (2000) argue:
"How do the unemployed keep up with the latest technological advances
without such hands-on experience? Being without a job, they may ￿nd their
skills rapidly go out of date, or just go rusty. Employers may avoid hiring
workers who have had an extended spell of unemployment." Blanchard and
Diamond (1994) argue that employers have slight preferences to hire short-
term unemployed. In this model, worker heterogeneity with respect to other
personal characteristics is unknown to the potential employer. In Acemoglu
(1995) long-term unemployed have to pass a screening stage. More precisely,
￿rms use a training program that serves as a screening device. If a long-term
unemployed person has lost some of his skills the ￿rm will realize that as soon
as employment begins. However, this produces temporary employment and,
hence, reduces the share of long-term unemployed. And ￿nally, extended
periods of unemployment can have negative e⁄ects on attitudes towards
work in the future (e.g. Sin￿eld (1981), Budd et al. (1988)).
The literature on di⁄erent experiences with long-term unemployment
can be subdivided into theoretical and empirical work. With respect to the
theoretical papers we ￿nd di⁄erent explanations for the causes of long-term
unemployment. Pissarides (1992) shows that allowing for a loss of skills
during unemployment increases persistence of unemployment shocks in the
following periods, because vacancy creation depends on the skill distribu-
tion of the workforce. Blanchard and Diamond (1994) argue that the exit
rate from unemployment is a decreasing function of unemployment duration.
The central assumption in this framework is that ￿rms hire the applicant
who has been unemployment for the least amount of time. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998) provide a model of general skills acquisition (when employed)
and loss (when unemployed) to explain the di⁄erence between North Amer-
ican and European unemployment experiences. They argue that generous
welfare payments in times of economic turbulence make the unemployed
more reluctant to take up poorly paid jobs. This causes the divergence in
long-term unemployment between North America and Europe. These results
are entirely due to labor supply e⁄ects, because labor demand is exogenous.
Haan et al. (2005) reassess the turbulence-unemployment relationship using
a matching model with endogenous job destruction and conclude that higher
turbulence leads to a reduction of unemployment. From this it follows that
4changes in turbulence cannot explain the di⁄erent experiences with unem-
ployment in North America and Europe.
Coles and Masters (2000) have examined the e⁄ect of skill depreciation
on the equilibrium unemployment rate and composition of unemployment
and retraining using a search and matching model. They get similar results
as Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), but generated through labor demand.
When unemployment bene￿ts are su¢ ciently low, the share of long-term
unemployed is zero. Using an e¢ ciency wage model Eriksson (2006) shows
that loss of skills during unemployment and ranking of the unemployed
increase unemployment. However, long-term unemployment is a⁄ected only
transitorily. An alternative explanation for the European experience with
high unemployment (and high long-term unemployment) is given by Haan
(2002). He argues that an increase in unemployment during the seventies
played a key role because it led to an increase in the obligation to pay
unemployment bene￿ts. The implied increase in the tax rates decreased job
creation and increased job destruction. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) argue
in a similar way.
Empirical literature on duration dependence exists in considerable num-
bers.4 Most of them are micro data studies that use in the majority of cases
a mixed proportional hazard model to analyze if the exit rate from unem-
ployment declines with duration of unemployment. The results are at best
mixed. The main reason for this is that it is di¢ cult to distinguish between
heterogeneity driven duration dependence and true duration dependence:
Heterogeneity driven duration dependence: Workers are heterogeneous and
those who have experienced a longer unemployment spell are more likely to
be of lower productivity. Employers sort them out and, hence, their exit
probability falls. True duration dependence: True duration dependence in
the sense that exit probabilities fall with the duration of the unemployment
spell despite the fact that workers are heterogeneous. Along with longer
unemployment spells workers may lose human capital.5
Heckman and Borjas (1980) di⁄erentiate four main types of structural
dependence: (1) Markov dependence: First the probability that an em-
ployed worker will become unemployed di⁄ers from the probability that an
unemployed worker will remain unemployed. (2) Occurrence dependence:
The number of previous unemployment spells a⁄ects the probability that a
worker will become or remain unemployed. (3) Duration dependence: The
probability of remaining unemployed increases with the current unemploy-
ment spell. (4) Lagged duration dependence: The probability of remaining
or becoming unemployed depends on the lengths of previous unemployment
spells.
4Early work that ￿nd duration dependent exit probabilities from unemployment are
Nickell (1979) and Lancaster (1979).
5See Acemoglu (1995) for a more detailed discussion of this view. For the latter view
see, for example, Sin￿eld (1981), Layard et al. (1991), and Pissarides (1992).
5Uncontrolled heterogeneity can have two sources: (1) The joint distrib-
ution of pure heterogeneity components is not determined by outcomes of
the employment and unemployment processes. That is, pure heterogeneity
components are exogenous to the process. (2) State dependent heterogene-
ity means that the unobserved loss components are direct outcomes of the
process itself and so are not exogenous to the process. That is, such a com-
ponent may a⁄ect future employment and unemployment and is a⁄ected by
past employment and unemployment.
Improper treatment of heterogeneity can lead to seriously biased esti-
mates of state dependence e⁄ects. Hence, without strong distributional
assumptions about the nature of heterogeneity it is impossible to separate
true duration dependence from spurious duration dependence, even if micro
data are used.6 The di⁄erent attempts for the treatment of heterogeneity
are likely to be one of the main causes for di⁄erent results across micro
studies.
More recent studies that deal with these aspects very carefully come to
more common results. Abbring et al. (2001) ￿nd signi￿cant exit proba-
bility di⁄erences between males and females and nonwhites and whites. In
addition, they ￿nd aggregated group-speci￿c exit probabilities that decline
with the duration of unemployment. Using data from the UK, Arulampalam
et al. (2000) ￿nd strong evidence of state dependence consistent with the
scarring theory of unemployment. Causes of state dependence (in unem-
ployment occurrence) or scarring are productivity discrimination or the use
of the employment history as a screening device.7 Using data for Spain,
Bover et al. (2002) conclude that the probability of ￿nding a job decreases
steadily with the duration of unemployment. Finally, Van den Berg and
van Ours (1994) ￿nd negative duration dependence for the UK, no strong
duration dependence for France, and a non-monotonic duration dependence
for the Netherlands. Furthermore they ￿nd signi￿cant unobserved hetero-
geneity for France and the Netherlands, while for UK heterogeneity seems
to be empirically unimportant.8
While micro data studies focus on the causes of an increasing share
of long-term unemployed, macroeconomic studies analyze in some cases if
duration dependence a⁄ects the unemployment rate. Haskel and Jackman
(1988), Budd et al. (1987) and Budd et al. (1988) ￿nd evidence that dura-
tion dependence a⁄ects the level of unemployment in the UK and Germany
but not in the Netherlands and the USA. Sider (1985) and Baker (1992) ￿nd
6See Heckman and Borjas (1980) for a detailed discussion.
7See Phelps (1972) and Lockwood (1991) for a more detailed discussion. See Rhum
(1991) for a discussion and an application to US data.
8However, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) conclude on the basis of a simulation model
"that the negative relationship between hazard rates and the length of unemployment
spells is mainly due to heterogeneity among the unemployed rather than duration depen-
dence."
6at the aggregated level for the USA, that duration has played a more promi-
nent role than incidence in steady state increases in the unemployment rate.
Jackman and Layard (1991) ￿nd no evidence for pure heterogeneity and at
best weak support for some heterogeneity. They explain the overall fall in
UK exit rates from unemployment by the combined e⁄ect of (1) a fall in
the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and (2) a higher proportion of the
unemployed being long-term unemployed. Using data for France, Abbring
et al. (2002) conclude that unobserved heterogeneity (dynamic sorting),
and not duration dependence (stigma e⁄ects), explains the observed nega-
tive duration dependence in the ￿rst six quarters of unemployment.9 For
higher durations negative individual duration dependence, and not dynamic
sorting, is important.
Furthermore, evidence has been found that the ratio of exit rates at
di⁄erent durations is relatively constant over time.10 Using data for 1995
Machin and Manning (1999) compare thirteen European countries and ￿nd
only minor cross country di⁄erences in duration dependence (with the ex-
ception of Sweden).
The main drawback of macro or aggregated time-series is that they are
not su¢ ciently informative, because they do not contain information on
the composition of the heterogeneous in￿ ow into unemployment. That is,
personal characteristics are unobserved. However, in principle the results of
Van den Berg and van Ours (1994) and Budd et al. (1987) and Budd et al.
(1988) do not point at di⁄erent directions. Furthermore, Van den Berg and
Klaauw (2001) compare the duration distribution of micro and macro data
for France and ￿nd only slightly but not signi￿cantly higher exit probabilities
for macro data. That is, the duration dependence pattern is almost the same
for both data. In addition, macro data have some advantages over micro
data: (1) Macro data provide the exact aggregate unemployment duration
distribution in the population (averaged over unobserved heterogeneity). (2)
They cover a much longer time span than is usual in micro data. (3) They
usually do not su⁄er from attrition. (4) In principle aggregated data cover
the whole population which makes such data better suited for the analysis of
the overall impact of aggregate events. (5) The macroeconomic consequences
of di⁄erences in exit rates on the unemployment rate can be analyzed much
better with macro data.11
In this paper the latter point is of interest. But what are the conse-
quences for the estimates? In case of (unobserved) heterogeneity, individuals
with the largest exit probability, on average, leave unemployment ￿rst. This
9One explanation for duration dependence is the stigma e⁄ects. It reduces the number
of job opportunities of the long-term unemployed. See, for example, Vishwanath (1989)
and Van den Berg (1990).
10See, for example, Jackman and Layard (1991) and Eriksson (1996).
11See Abbring et al. (2002) for a discussion of macro data in the context of duration
dependence.
7leads to a decline in the average quality of a cohort of unemployed from pe-
riod to period (e.g. due to an increasing share of low skilled or discouraged
worker). Hence, negative duration dependence in observed aggregated exit
probabilities may occur even in the absence of true duration dependence.
This is important for policy analysis. However, the estimates are biased only
in the sense that we can not distinguish between (unobserved) heterogene-
ity and true duration dependence. They are not biased with respect to the
impact of the observed aggregated duration dependence.
A simple example: Let us assume that X =   +￿, whereby X is the ob-
served aggregated duration dependence,   is the true duration dependence,
and ￿ is the unobserved heterogeneity. The e⁄ect of   on the exit probability
is biased, if   and ￿ are correlated. The e⁄ect of X on the exit probability
is not biased, but we can not distinguish between the e⁄ects of   and ￿.
However, the latter objective is not the aim of this paper.
Put di⁄erently, if the share of long-term unemployed has an e⁄ect on
the level of unemployment, it is of importance to estimate the magnitude
of this e⁄ect. This point seems to be neglected somewhat in the literature.
In addition, given that there are speci￿c groups in the pool of long-term
unemployed that experience very low exit probabilities (no true duration
dependence), then it is appropriate to suppose that these groups can be
identi￿ed simply by closer inspection of the unemployment statistics. That
is, policy analysis is still possible, even if we estimate the observed aggre-
gated duration dependence only. In the theoretical and empirical section
we use only the term duration dependence. That is, in the empirical part
duration dependence means observed aggregated duration dependence.
3 The Model
Following Machin and Manning (1999) two main hypotheses are developed
to explain international di⁄erences in long-term unemployment. A third
hypothesis that is of interest in this paper relates to an internationally sta-
ble relationship between the distribution of unemployment by duration and
the unemployment rate. In this section we develop a model that allows to
di⁄erentiate between these three hypotheses:
1. A collapse in the reemployment probabilities from unemployment at
all durations of unemployment accounts for the increase in the share
of long-term unemployed.
2. In contrast to the ￿rst hypothesis, the exit rate from unemployment
declined only for the long-term unemployed, while the other exit rates
have remained constant.
3. There is international evidence for a stable negative relationship be-
8tween the duration of unemployment and the reemployment probabil-
ity.12
In addition, the framework given below enables us to consider a fourth
possible explanation. Jackman et al. (1996) consider the in￿ ow rates into
unemployment as a potential reason for the di⁄erent experiences with un-
employment. The idea is that higher job destruction rates produce higher
unemployment for a given exit rate from unemployment. They do not ￿nd
any important trend that could explain the rise in unemployment. In addi-
tion, we will see below that the job destruction rate is not able to explain
a permanent change in the distribution of unemployment by duration. The
e⁄ect is simply transitory.
The review in the previous section reveals that it seems to be a use-
ful approach to extend the standard equilibrium unemployment model by
unemployment duration dependent job ￿nding probabilities.13 In addition,
this would o⁄er the possibility to assess the above mentioned explanations.
Let us assume people can only be employed or unemployed and live
forever. New cohorts do not enter the labor market. In the standard stock-
￿ ow model for steady state unemployment we have equal ￿ ows into and out
of unemployment. The ￿ ow of people into unemployment in a given period is
equal to the short-term unemployed in this period. Some of them ￿nd a new
job within the same period, others don￿ t. The same is true for those who
became unemployed in previous periods and are still unemployed. Some of
them ￿nd a new job within this period, the rest remains unemployed. From
this it follows that the back￿ ow into employment consists of people with
di⁄erent experiences of unemployment duration.
Given that ￿rms are more reluctant to hire applicants with a longer
unemployment duration, the back￿ ow probability decreases with increasing
unemployment periods. In addition, one could argue that the search inten-
sity of the unemployed decreases with increasing individual unemployment
duration.
In the standard approach for steady state unemployment stock-￿ ow mod-
els the ￿ ow from unemployment to employment is equal to the ￿ ow in the
opposite direction
pU = ￿E: (1)
U is the number of unemployed and E is the number of workers. On
average an unemployed worker ￿nds a job during a period with the prob-
ability p. The equilibrium in search and matching models usually depends
12This is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for Hypotheses one and two if an
international panel data set is used.
13See, for example, Pissarides (2000) for a good introduction to the standard equilib-
rium unemployment model.
9on a measure of the tightness of the labor market de￿ned as the ratio of
vacancies to unemployed, ￿ = V=U. The probability p depends on the labor
market tightness ￿ because it determines how successful search is. Finally,
the probability that a job will be destroyed by an idiosyncratic shock in a






An increase in the vacancy rate increases the market tightness and,
hence, the probability p. This is why equation (2) is sometimes referred
to as the Beveridge curve. The Beveridge curve shift outwards if ￿ increases
and vice versa.
It is easy to see that the probability p(￿) can be interpreted as a weighted
average with weights given by the distribution of unemployment by duration.
This follows directly from












The term riski is the probability of being unemployed with a speci￿c
duration of unemployment. Put alternatively, the risk of being unemployed
is the sum of duration dependent risks (u =
P
i riski). In addition, riski is
equal to the unemployment rate weighted by the duration dependent group
size si = Ui=U = ui=u. Equation (3) points out that the assumption of a
constant p(￿) for a given ￿ is a special case of a more general approach in
which di⁄erent duration speci￿c reemployment probabilities are considered.
Put di⁄erently, if and only if p(￿) is the same for all unemployed, the distri-
bution of the duration dependent shares has no impact on the average value
of p. Only then duration dependence does not exist.
Let us now assume that the reemployment probability for a speci￿c un-
employed person depends on his spell of unemployment. For i = 1;2;:::;N
(continuous) unemployment periods the duration speci￿c reemployment prob-
ability pi (￿) decreases with an increasing number of periods, if the proba-
bility to ￿nd a job decreases from period to period. Hence, duration depen-
dence
p1 (￿) > p2 (￿) > ::: > pN (￿) (4)
simply means that the shorter the duration of unemployment, the higher
the back￿ ow probability. It is assumed that ￿ does not have an e⁄ect on the
ratio of the pi￿ s. That is, all pi￿ s decrease proportionally if ￿ decreases. This
10assumption is in line with empirical ￿ndings described at the beginning
of this section. To each pi (￿) corresponds a number of unemployed Ui
with an unemployment experience of i periods, hence, Ui is the sum of the
unemployed persons. Other reasons for heterogeneity, like skills, gender, or
age remain unconsidered.
Following equation, (3), this yields:
X
i
pi (￿)siu = p(￿;f (s))u (5)
From this it follows that the larger the si for higher numbers of i, the
lower p. Hence, the average exit rate does not only depend on the market
tightness but also on the distribution of unemployment by duration, f (s).
That is, the quantity of unemployment is measured by ￿ and the quality by
f (s).
For the ￿ ow equilibrium (1), follows that
X
pi (￿)siU = ￿E (6)
It is assumed that the distribution of the unemployed by duration has
no impact on ￿E, because the idiosyncratic shock rate is independent for a









￿ + p(￿;f (s))
. (7)
While ￿ shifts the Beveridge curve outwards, pi shifts the curve inwards.
For si most e⁄ects are ambiguous. This is simply because if one of the shares
changes, at least one of the others changes too. If the assumption in equation
(4) holds,it is unambiguous that @u=@s1 < 0 and @u=@sn > 0. Hence, an
increasing share of long-term unemployed increases the unemployment rate
at given pi and ￿, and the opposite is true if the share of the single-period
unemployed increases.
In the empirical part of the paper we distinguish between three di⁄erent
duration groups only, due to data availability. Hence, for a model with
short-term (S), medium-term (M) and long-term (L) unemployed, steady
state equilibrium unemployment is given by
u =
￿
￿ + pS (￿)sS + pM (￿)sM + pL (￿)sL
. (8)
In this case only the e⁄ect of sM is ambiguous. However, @u=@sM < 0
if the change in sM is to the disadvantage of sL, and @u=@sM > 0 if it is to
11the disadvantage of sS. Given the assumption in equation (4) we can order













We now fractionize the ￿ ow into employment into in￿ ow units to point
out under which conditions the shares change. The evolution of the aggre-
gated rate of unemployment is given by the di⁄erence between in￿ ow and
out￿ ow. In a steady state, an equal number of persons ￿ ow into unemploy-
ment and back into employment. It is assumed that short-term unemploy-
ment is a one period unemployment experience.
In period one, ￿E people lose their job. In the same period a share ￿ ￿nd
a new job and the share (1 ￿ ￿)￿E remain in unemployment and leave the
group of short term unemployed at the end of the period. From this it follows
that the share of one period unemployed is a ￿ ow quantity. In the next
period the share (1 ￿ ￿)￿E is the ￿ ow into medium-term unemployment.
Again, this quantity is divided into two groups, an out￿ ow into employment
according to the share ￿ and a remaining part (1 ￿ ￿). This does not mean
that the fraction ￿ of those who become medium-term unemployed ￿nd a
new job, but the number of medium-term unemployed equal to ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿E
get reemployed.
For simplicity we assume that there is only one additional third group,
the long-term unemployed. The ￿ ow into the duration group of long-term
unemployed,(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿E, is equal to the number of people ￿nding a
new job, if this is the group with the last duration category. People cannot
be more than long-term unemployed.14
￿E = ￿￿E + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿E + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿E (10)
In steady state ￿E is ￿xed. The term ￿￿E is equal to pSsS. In steady
state ￿ cannot change, because this would change p, which is also ￿xed. From
this it follows that neither pS nor sS can change. The same applies to the
medium-term unemployed. The share ￿ cannot change, since ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿E
is equal to pMsM. Hence, (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿E remains unchanged, too.
The framework allows the following conclusions with respect to a steady
state equilibrium, _ u = 0:
1. Constant ￿ ows imply constant duration dependent probabilities and
shares: _ pi = 0, _ si = 0.
14Remember we assume that people can only be employed or unemployed and live
forever. New cohorts do not enter the labor market.
122. For given values of the duration dependent probabilities, it follows
from equation (8) that the larger the sum sM + sL the lower the ￿ ow
quantities and, hence, the probability that an employed becomes un-
employed.
3. The larger ￿ and ￿ the lower the probability of being long-term unem-
ployed. However, the probability of remaining long-term unemployed
increases.
Out of steady state, _ u 6= 0, the following conclusions are possible:
1. From equation (8) it follows that the larger sS (sL), the smaller (larger)
the unemployment rate. Hence, the unemployment rate is negatively
related to sS and positively correlated with sL. The correlation of the
unemployment rate with sM depends on the di⁄erence between pM and
p. In addition, it follows that a fall in the reemployment probability
at any duration will tend to raise sL. In this case u is driven mainly
by pLsL and a new equilibrium will be reached at a slower rate.
2. The share sS ￿rst increases with ￿ and then decreases, for given num-
bers of employed workers, E, and the duration dependent ￿ ow proba-
bilities. In this case all other shares decrease and the unemployment
rate increases. However, as long as E and the pi￿ s are constant the
shares will move back to their initial ratio. Only the unemployment
rate changes with ￿.
3. The smaller the negative duration dependence the larger is sS and the
smaller sL. However, a decrease in pS and pL for a given pM increases
sS and sL. Additionally, sL increases if pS decreases for given values
of pM and pL.
4. Strong ￿ uctuations in ￿ produce waves of newly unemployed. These
waves pass through the shares one after another. For large di⁄erences
in duration dependent ￿ ow probabilities or small values for all pi￿ s,
the impacts of recessions on unemployment are much stronger, be-
cause this leads to a tsunami for the share of long-term unemployed.
In addition, the tsunami is lagged behind the increase in the unem-
ployment rate.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we investigate empirically the relation between unemployment
and the distribution of unemployment by duration. In a ￿rst step we take a
look at the correlation coe¢ cients to reassess the conclusions derived above.
The second part deals with estimates of a panel data model for 16 OECD
countries.
134.1 Empirical Stylized Facts
A comparison of data for the unemployment rate and the share of long-term
unemployment over time for almost all OECD countries reveals that if the
unemployment rate has risen so has the share of long-term unemployment.15
In order to provide a ￿rst cross country evidence for our data we calculate
correlation coe¢ cients for all countries considered in this paper. Table 1
provides the correlation coe¢ cients for the unemployment rate and the du-
ration groups short-term, medium-term, and long-term unemployment. The
coe¢ cients refer to 16 OECD countries and the period 1975 to 2000. For a
detailed data description see section 4.2.
As predicted in the theoretical model above, the unemployment rate is
negatively related to short-term unemployment and positively to the share
of long-term unemployed. The correlation between the share of medium-
term unemployed and the unemployment rate is almost zero. This means
that pm ￿ p. Hence, a change in this share has only minor e⁄ects on the
average job ￿nding probability.




u -0.5114 0.0731 0.5481
sS: share of short-term unemployed; sM: share of medium-term unemployed; sL:
share of long-term unemployed; u: unemployment rate
The remaining correlation coe¢ cients imply that (a) if the share of short-
term unemployed increases, the remaining shares decrease and vice versa,
and (b) a week linear bivariate relation exists only between the share of
medium-term and long-term unemployed. The ￿rst observation is in line
with previous observations that the share of long-term unemployed is lagged
behind the actual unemployment rate. This can be explained by applying
the model above. Let us assume, for example, a one period shock hits the
economy. An increase in the idiosyncratic shock rate, ￿, increases in the
same period the share of short-term unemployed and the unemployment
rate, but decreases the other shares. In the next period a part of this wave
of newly unemployed move into the share of medium-term unemployed. At
the same time the share of short-term unemployed decreases and the share of
long-term unemployed increases (but is still smaller than before the shock!).
The unemployment rate now starts to decrease. In the next period the
remaining part of the unemployment wave enters the share of long-term
15See Machin and Manning (1999) and Webster (2005) for a detailed discussion.
14unemployed. The unemployment rate decreases further, while the share of
long-term unemployed increases.
4.2 Data
The standardized unemployment rate (u) is taken from the OECD online
database. Unemployment by duration is subdivided into short-term unem-
ployment (up to three months unemployed), medium-term unemployment
(more than three months and up to one year unemployed), and long-term
unemployed (more than one year unemployed). These data are taken from
the OECD online database, too.
To get reliable estimates we consider a set of institutional and macroeco-
nomic control variables. Institutional control variables are: The variables
that measure labor market policy are bene￿t replacement rate (brr), bene￿t
duration (bd), employment protection (ep), year to year changes in net union
density (ud), and coordination of bargaining (co). Bene￿t replacement rate
is a percentage of average earnings before tax and refers to the ￿rst year of
unemployment, and bene￿t duration is measured by the replacement rate in
the second to ￿fth year of unemployment, relative to that of the ￿rst year.16
Employment protection increases with strictness of employment protection
and has the range f0;2g. Net union density is constructed as the ratio of
total reported union members minus retired and unemployed members. Co-
ordination of bargaining is an index with range f1;3g and increases in the
degree of coordination in the bargaining process on the employers￿as well as
on the unions￿side. Macroeconomic control variables are: Terms of Trade
shocks (tts), labor demand shocks (lds), total factor productivity (tfp), real
interest rate (r), and vacancy rate (v). The institutional as well as the
pure macroeconomic control variables are taken from Nickell and Nunciata
(2002).
With respect to the countries considered only those are accounted for
who provide data for unemployment shares at lest for ten years: Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
and USA. The period is 1975 to 1995 due to data availability.
4.3 Econometric Model and Results
In this section we analyze econometrically whether the distribution of un-
employment by duration has an e⁄ect on the level of the unemployment
rate. In particular the identi￿cation of duration dependence that is sta-
ble over time and across countries is of interest here. In the theoretical
section we have concluded that an increase in the share of short-term unem-
ployed decreases the unemployment rate, while an increase in the share of
16See Nickell and Nunziata (2002) for a detailed description on how bd is calculated.
15the long-term unemployed increases unemployment, if and only if duration
dependence exists. For medium-term unemployed the prediction depends
on the di⁄erence between pM and p.
Due to data availability we distinguish between three di⁄erent duration
groups only. The share of short-term unemployed, sS, comprises of people
with a spell of unemployment of up to three month. The cut for the remain-
ing unemployed is at one year unemployment. In the estimates only two of
three shares can be included, since they sum up to one. We therefore esti-
mate all three possible combinations. This allows us to interpret the share
e⁄ects more speci￿cally, since the estimated e⁄ects are always on account of
the excluded share. We argue that signi￿cantly di⁄erent estimates for the
shares correspond to signi￿cantly di⁄erent pi￿ s.
To ensure that we estimate the share e⁄ects, we control also for the
e⁄ect of the vacancies on unemployment. That is we estimate the Beveridge
curve. The vacancies might have some measurement errors, since they are
calculated on the basis of national de￿nitions. Hence, we have to be careful
at least with respect to the slope of the Beveridge curve. In order to make
the results more robust, we consider a comprehensive set of control variables
(comparable to that of Nickell et al. (2005)) and countries, respectively.
The following equation will be estimated:
log(uit) = ￿0 + ￿1sjit + ￿2skit
+￿3brrit + ￿4bdit + ￿5epit + ￿6udit + ￿7coit
+￿8ttsit + ￿9ldsit + ￿10tfpit + ￿11rit + ￿12 log(vit)
+￿i + ￿t + ￿it
sj and sk are two of the three duration groups (sS;sM;sL) and ￿i and
￿t are ￿xed cross-country and time e⁄ects, respectively. We consider two
additional speci￿cations to account in a di⁄erent way for unobserved het-
erogeneity. First, instead of time e⁄ects we consider a time trend and coun-
try speci￿c ￿rst order autoregressive terms. Second, we do the same but
now with country speci￿c time trends instead of the aggregated time trend.
White robust covariances are used to control for cross-equation correlation
and di⁄erent error variances in each cross-section unit.
Table 2 displays the main results. For complete results we refer to the
appendix. Regressions 1 to 3 are speci￿ed as standard ￿xed e⁄ects models.
The negative e⁄ect of the short-term share is twice as large if it is on account
of the share of long-term unemployed. For the positive e⁄ects of the long-
term share the exact opposite is the case. For the share of medium-term
unemployed we ￿nd a decreasing (increasing) e⁄ect on unemployment, if it is
on account of the long-term share (short-term share). All estimated e⁄ects
are signi￿cant at the 1% level.
16Regressions 4 to 6 and 7 to 9 have di⁄erent speci￿cations with respect
to unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated e⁄ects remain signi￿cant at the
1% level and the relative di⁄erences between them are quite stable, although
the parameters decrease somewhat.
The results provide strong evidence that the distribution of unemploy-
ment by duration has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level of the unemployment
rate. Hence, the hypothesis of internationally stable (observed aggregated)
duration dependence is con￿rmed. Based on the Wald test we can conclude
that the estimated coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent in all cases. All test
results are signi￿cant at the 1% level. Therefore, we can conclude that the
cross country di⁄erences in duration dependence are quite small.
With respect to the two remaining hypotheses we argue as follows: A
deterioration of the exit rate for long-term unemployed would imply that
the parameter pL has fallen over time. In addition, we have to expect
stronger country di⁄erences for this parameter than for the other exit rates.
In both cases the signi￿cance level of the respective parameters should be
weak. In contrast to this the hypothesis of a collapse in the reemployment
probabilities from unemployment at all durations would be compatible with
signi￿cant parameters, if the ratio of exit rates at di⁄erent durations are
relatively constant over time and across countries.
The results are in line only with the latter hypothesis. Hence, the high
share of long-term unemployed is no evidence of a particular reemployment
problem for the long-term unemployed. Again, it is not the aim of the pa-
per to disentangle true duration dependence and (unobserved) heterogeneity,
but the di⁄erences in duration speci￿c average exit rates. Nevertheless, the
results are in the same way consistent with employers sorting in considera-
tion of (un)observed individual characteristics. In addition, Abbring et al.
(2002) conclude that (true) duration dependence, and not dynamic sorting,
is important for long-term unemployed. Hence, these results are also in line
with the hypothesis of a collapse in the exit rates at all durations.
Caution is needed when interpreting the estimates in a way that Euro-
pean countries generally do not experience duration dependent exit rates
from unemployment di⁄erent from those in North America, Japan, New
Zealand, or Australia. The estimates do not provide information about the
average exit rate from unemployment.
Based on the conclusions at the end of the third section we should ex-
pect that countries with very low duration dependent exit rates reach a new
equilibrium at a slower rate. However, the new higher equilibrium unem-
ployment rate is reached very fast, if such an economy is hit by a shock on
the way to that equilibrium. This could explain the German experience with
a stairs-shaped development of unemployment in the last three decades. In
addition, we can explain the East German experience with unemployment.
After the German reuni￿cation the rapid increase in unemployment occurred
not only because of higher destruction rates but also on account of a decline
17Table 2: Main regression results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sS -0.030z -0.015z -0.021z -0.011z -0.024z -0.012z
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
sM -0.015z 0.015z -0.011z 0.011z -0.012z 0.012z
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
sL 0.015z 0.030z 0.011z 0.021z 0.012z 0.024z
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
R2 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.982 0.982 0.982
FE X X X X X X X X X
TE X X X
AT X X X
CT X X X
AR X X X X X X
W 84.72z 84.72z 84.72z 224.10z 224.10z 224.10z 168.82z 168.82z 168.82z
N 258 258 258 242 242 242 242 242 242
Notes: dependent variable: log of unemployment rate; sS: share of short-term unemployed; sM:
share of medium-term unemployed; sL: share of long-term unemployed; FE: ￿xed e⁄ects; TE:
time e⁄ects; AT: aggregated time trend; CT: country time trend; AR: ￿rst order autoregressive
term; W: Wald test (Chi-square) for the null hypothesis sj= sk; N: observations; z: signi￿cant
at the 1% level; standard error in parenthesis.
in the exit rates at all durations. This has triggered the tsunami e⁄ect
described above.17
To reveal the estimated impact of a change in the distribution of unem-
ployment by duration we compare the rate of unemployment with a hypo-
thetical unemployment rate with a "frozen" duration distribution. Needless
to say that the latter is somewhat unrealistic. However, it helps to illustrate
the impact of the share distribution on the unemployment rate. Figure 1
includes the actual rate of unemployment (ur), the estimated rate of unem-
ployment (est), and the estimated rate of unemployment with a constant
share of long-term unemployed (no) for all countries except New Zealand
and Portugal.18 The "frozen" share of long-term unemployed is always the
17The consideration of (observed aggregated) duration dependence in the equilibrium
unemployment framework helps to soften Shimer￿ s (2005) criticism, whereby the theoret-
ical model can explain the business cycles to a moderate extent only.
18For these two countries we only have nine observation, 1987 to 1995.
18country speci￿c value of the ￿rst year in the estimates. The estimated un-
employment rates are calculated based on regression 9.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The estimated unemployment rates approximate the actual unemploy-
ment rates quite well. The hypothetical unemployment rate with a constant
share of long-term unemployed has to be compared primarily with the esti-
mated values. Only those economies with a stable and small average share
of long-term unemployed experience an almost stationary unemployment
rate. The share of long-term unemployed varies in Canada between 4% and
17.8%, in Japan between 12.5% and 22.4% and in the US between 4.2%
and 13.3% over the observational period. In addition, the unemployment
rate with constant shares is not much di⁄erent from the other ones for these
countries, with the exception of Canada since 1992.
In contrast to this, the di⁄erence between the rate with the frozen long-
term share and the remaining two rates is seizable for France and Spain.
For France and Spain the average shares are 36% and 48%, respectively.
Although we cannot simply argue that, for example, the unemployment
rate has doubled in Spain solely because of shifts in the distribution of
unemployment by duration, the ￿gures suggest that duration dependence
and a fall in all duration dependent exit rates have a substantial impact on
the unemployment rate.
The Nordic Countries are good examples to illustrate what happens to
the share of long-term unemployed if the economy is hit by a large shock.
Before the economic slowdown Sweden, Norway, and Finland have been
exceptions to the European experience with long-term unemployment. The
estimates reveal that even these countries could run into serious problems
with respect to higher unemployment rates, even though the unemployment
rate has not risen much in Norway.
The ￿gures for Denmark (since 1986), Germany (1991 to 1993), the
Netherlands (since 1987), and the UK (1989 to 1993) provide information
about how the share of long-term unemployed can slow down a decline in
the unemployment rate. This is in line with the theoretical conclusions,
whereby the unemployment rate declines faster and reaches a lower level,
if the share of long-term unemployed is small or decreases simultaneously.
While the unemployment rate continues to increase in Germany over the sec-
ond half of the nineties, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK experience
a substantial decline in unemployment. For example, the share of long-term
unemployed decreases from 44% (1983) to 20% (2000) in Denmark, from
59% (1985) to 27% (2002) in the Netherlands, and from 50% (1985) to 23%
(2002) in the UK. The unemployment rates decrease in the same period
from 11.4% to 4.6% in Denmark, from 10.9 to 3.1% in the Netherlands, and
from 11.3 to 5.1% in the UK. However, these examples also show that the
19reduction of long-term unemployment takes time. The good message is that
European countries could experience a markedly lower unemployment rate
in the future. This leaves the question as to what increases the exit rates
from unemployment?
5 Policy to Reduce Long-Term Unemployment
Advice on policies towards long-term unemployment are ambiguous. A part
of the literature deals with e⁄ects on the average exit probability from un-
employment. A number of studies ￿nd that an increase in unemployment
compensation reduces the exit rate from unemployment signi￿cantly.19 Us-
ing data from the UK, Arulampalam and Steward (1995) come to the same
conclusion. In addition, they point out that in times of high unemployment
the e⁄ects of bene￿ts decline. Instead demand constraints (lack of job of-
fers) are found to have strong negative e⁄ects on the exit rate. Lalive et
al. (2008) ￿nd that Swiss active labor market programmes do not a⁄ect the
duration of unemployment.
Using data for Spain, Bover et al. (2002) conclude that more ￿ exibility
on the labor market and a reduction in unemployment bene￿ts and bene￿t
duration increase the exit rates out of unemployment. However, they ￿nd
larger e⁄ects in an expansion than in a recession. Acemoglu (1995) argues
in a similar way on the basis of a theoretical model. Labor market poli-
cies reduce the incentives of long-term unemployed to maintain their skills.
Burgess and Turon (2005) conclude that economies with costly job search
exhibit higher unemployment rates and lower worker ￿ ow rates. From this
it could follow that employment protection has positive e⁄ects on long-term
unemployment. However, this is not a conclusion advanced by the authors.
With respect to policy advice, it seems to be important to account for
the results of Arulampalam and Steward (1995) and Bover et al. (2002). In
times of high unemployment and bad macroeconomic performance it seems
to be unhelpful to reduce bene￿ts. Moreover, their results could be an in-
dication of a stock of people who are a⁄ected by the level of bene￿ts with
respect to their search activity. This stock is independent of the business cy-
cle and labor demand growth.20 For the remaining unemployed with higher
search intensity a reduction in bene￿ts could result in faster job acceptance
(￿rst-best job) and, hence, lower average job match duration. This, in turn,
could reduce the matching quality and job creation.21 The same conclusions
apply if duration dependence is the result of sorting by the unemployed
19See, for example, Card and Levine (2000), Lalive (2006), Lalive and Zweim￿ller
(2004), Lalive et al. (2006), Rłed and Zhang (2003), and van Ours and Vodopivec (2006).
20This groups is to some extent comparable to the rest unemployed in Jovanovic (1987)
and Alvarez and Shimer (2008).
21See Belzil (2001) for a discussion of that point and an empirical investigation for
Canada.
20themselves. That is, those who become unemployed have di⁄erent search
intensities and, hence, they select themselves into the groups of short-term
or long-term unemployed.
Another part of the literature argues that policies to reduce long-term
unemployment need to be based on the precise mechanism underlying the
observed duration dependence. The two main explanations are heterogene-
ity driven duration dependence and true duration dependence. Van den Berg
and van Ours (1994) conclude that policy should be directed towards pre-
venting workers becoming long-term unemployed if duration dependence is
important. If personal characteristics are important, policy may be oriented
towards training activities. Following Arulampalam et al. (2000) policies
reducing short-run unemployment incidence will have longer-run e⁄ects by
reducing equilibrium rate of unemployment only if there is true state depen-
dence. These policies will have no e⁄ect if the dependence in unemployment
incidence does not exist. Coles and Masters (2000) suggest that subsidiz-
ing retraining to reduce long-term unemployment is inappropriate. Instead,
they conclude that the government should subsidize vacancy creation. In
addition, Bean (1997) and Pissarides (1992) point out that the lower aver-
age quality of job applicants, due to a large share of long-term unemployed,
leads ￿rms to open viewer vacancies during a demand contraction, thus ex-
acerbating the problem.
The only unambiguous ￿nding from this literature appears to be that
vacancy creation is a driving force. In equilibrium search models the proba-
bilities of ￿nding a job and ￿lling a vacancy are closely connected. Garibaldi
and Mauro (1999) have shown that job creation is larger in the US, Canada,
and Australia than in European countries. They conclude that labor market
institutions may be an important explanation for international di⁄erences.
However, we have controlled for labor market institutions in our estimates.
Hetze and Ochsen (2006) point out that oil price shocks and the interest
rate a⁄ect the European countries more than North America.
As pointed out in the theoretical section a di⁄erent experience with job
destruction is not a cause for an increase in the share of long-term unem-
ployment. Of course, the unemployment rate will change, but the shares are
a⁄ected only transitorily.
Finally, early retirement schemes could be a reason for the rise in long-
term unemployment. Primarily, this policy instrument is used in a lot of
European countries to reduce long-term unemployment. However, early
retirement schemes also signal to ￿rms that the average value of a job match
with an older worker could be lower than that of a match with a younger one.
Hetze and Ochsen (2006) ￿nd strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
On the other hand ￿rms get rid of unproductive workers at ￿rst and those
older workers, who remain in jobs, are of high quality. Hence, ￿rms are
willing to employ these older but highly productive workers, which means
that job creation is enhanced while this policy is in place. Stopping early
21retirement programs implies that this productivity gain disappears.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the e⁄ects of the distribution of unemployment by
duration on the level of unemployment. We explore one central assump-
tion that is observed empirically: when the share of long-term (short-term)
unemployed increases, the unemployment rate increases (decreases). In the
theoretical part of the paper an extension of the standard equilibrium un-
employment model that allows for unemployment duration dependent job
￿nding probabilities is provided. In the empirical part of the paper we apply
di⁄erent panel estimators on data for 16 OECD countries to test the impli-
cations of the theoretical model. The approach allows us to analyze three
central questions: First, is there international evidence for a stable nega-
tive relation between the duration of unemployment and the reemployment
probability? Second, can the increase in the share of long-term unemployed
be accounted for by a collapse in the reemployment probabilities from un-
employment at all durations? Third, in contrast to the second question, has
the exit rate from unemployment fallen only for the long-term unemployed,
while the other exit rates have remained constant?
Main results are: First, in a steady state equilibrium the ￿ ow rates are
larger, the larger the share of short-term unemployed. In addition, the risk of
becoming long-term unemployed is smaller, but the probability of remaining
in long-term unemployment is larger. Second, out of steady state the unem-
ployment rate increases (decreases) with the share of long-term (short-term)
unemployed. Third, the larger the duration dependent job ￿nding probabil-
ities the larger the share of short term unemployed. In addition, the smaller
the duration dependent job ￿nding probabilities, the more the unemploy-
ment rate is driven by long-term unemployment. Fourth, panel estimates for
16 OECD countries provide robust and signi￿cant evidence that an increase
in the share of short-term (long-term) unemployment decreases (increases)
the unemployment rate. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports the hy-
potheses one and three whereby (a) the reemployment probability decreases
with an increasing spell of unemployment and (b) average exit rates exhibit
cross country variation. Hence, the di⁄erent experiences with unemploy-
ment in North America, Australia, and Japan on the one hand, and Europe
on the other hand, can be explained by observed aggregated duration de-
pendence and di⁄erences in the average exit rate. This means that it is
not only the exit rate from unemployment for long-term unemployed that is
worse in Europe than in the US.
The approach in this paper can be extended by distinguishing the labor
force according to gender, skills, or age. Especially the latter seems to be
important since the next 20 years demographic change will alter drastically
22the structure of employment within the industrialized countries.
7 Appendix
8 References
Abbring, J.H.; van den Berg, G.J.; van Ours, J.C., 2001, Business cycles
and compositional variation in U.S. unemployment, Journal of Busi-
ness & Economic Statistics 19,436-448.
Abbring, J.H.; van den Berg, G.J.; van Ours, J.C., 2002, The anatomy of
unemployment dynamics, European Economic Review 46, 1785-1824.
Acemoglu, D., 1995, Public policy in a model of long-term unemployment,
Economica 62, 161-178.
Alvarez, F., Shimer, R., 2008, Search and rest unemployment, NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 13772.
Arulampalam, W.; Booth, A.L., Taylor, M.P., 2000, Unemployment per-
sistence, Oxford Economic Papers 52, 24-50.
Arulampalam, W., Stewart, M.B., 1995, The determinants of individual
unemployment durations in an era of high unemployment, Economic
Journal 105, 321-332.
Baker, M., 1992, Unemployment duration: Composition e⁄ects and cyclical
variability, American Economic Review 82(1), 313-321.
Bean, C.R., 1997, The role of demand management policies in reducing
unemployment, in: D.J. Snower and G. de la Dehesa (eds), Unem-
ployment policies: Government options for the labour market, CEPR
Conference Volume, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Belzil, C., 2001, Unemployment insurance and subsequent job duration:
Job matching versus unobserved heterogeneity, Journal of Applied
Econometrics 16, 619-636.
Blanchard, O. J.; Diamond, P., 1994, Ranking, unemployment duration,
and wages, Review of Economic Studies 61, 417-434.
Bover, O.; Arellano, M.; Bentolila, S., 2002, Unemployment duration, ben-
e￿t duration and the business cycle, Economic Journal 112, 223-265.
Budd, A.; Levine, P.; Smith, P., 1987, Long-Term unemployed and the
shifting U-V curve, European Economic Review 31, 296-305.
23Budd, A.; Levine, P.; Smith, P., 1988, Unemployment, vacancies and the
long-term unemployed, Economic Journal 98, 1071-1091.
Burgess, S., Turon, H., 2005, Worker ￿ ows, job ￿ ows and unemployment
in a matching model, University of Bristol, Department of Economics,
Discussion Paper No. 05/572.
Card, D.E., LevineP.B., 2000, Extended bene￿ts and the duration of UI
spells: Evidence from the New Jersey Extended Bene￿t Program,
Journal of Public Economics 78(1), 107-138.
Coles, M., Masters, A., 2000, Retraining and long-term unemployment in
a model of unlearning by not doing, European Economic Review 44,
1801-1822.
Daveri, F., Tabellini, G., 2000, Unemployment, growth and taxation in
industrial countries, Economic Policy 15, 47-104.
Den Haan, W.J., 2002, Temporary shocks and unavoidable transitions to
a high-unemployment regime, NBER Working Paper Series, Working
Paper 9349.
Den Haan, W.J.; Haefke, C.; Ramey, G., 2004, Turbulence and unemploy-
ment in a job matching model, IZA, Discussion Paper No. 1403.
Eriksson, S., 2006, Skill loss, ranking of job applicants and the dynamics
of unemployment, German Economic Review 7(3), 265-296.
Eriksson, T., 1996, Unemployment in Finland, in: E. Wadensj￿ (ed), The
Nordic Labour Market in the 1990s, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 65-104.
Garibaldi, P., Mauro, P., 1999, Deconstructing job creation, IMF Working
Paper 99/109.
Haskel, J., Jackman, R., 1988, Long-Term unemployment in Britain and
the e⁄ects on the community programme, Oxford Bulletin of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 50, 379-408.
Heckman, J.J., Borjas, G.J., 1980, Does unemployment cause future unem-
ployment? De￿nitions, questions and answers from a continuous time
model of heterogeneity and state dependence, Economica 47, 247-283.
Hetze, P. Ochsen, C., 2006, Age E⁄ects on Equilibrium Unemployment,
Rostock Center for the Study of Demographic Change, Discussion Pa-
per No 1.
Jackman, R., Layard, R.; 1991, Does long-term unemployment reduce a
person￿ s chance of a Job? A time series test, Economica 58, 93-106.
24Jackman, R.; Layard, R.; Nickell, S., 1996, Structural aspects of OECD un-
employment, unpublished manuscript (London School of Economics)
Jovanovic, B., 1987, Work, rest and search: Unemployment, turnover, and
the cycle, Journal of Labor Economics 5(2), 131-148.
Lalive, R., 2006, How do extended bene￿ts a⁄ect unemployment duration?
A regression discontinuity approach, IFAU Working Paper 2006:8.
Lalive, R.; van Ours, J.; Zweim￿ller, J., 2006, How changes in ￿nancial
incentives a⁄ect the duration of unemployment. Review of Economic
Studies 73, 1009-1038.
Lalive, R.; van Ours, J.; Zweim￿ller, J., 2008, The impact of active labour
market programmes on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland,
Economic Journal 118, 235-257.
Lalive, R., Zweim￿ller, J., 2004, Bene￿t entitlement and unemployment
duration: The role of policy edogeneity, Journal of Public Economics
88(12), 2587-2616.
Lancaster, T., 1979, Econometric methods for the duration of unemploy-
ment, Econometrica 47, 939-956.
Layard, R.; Nickell, S.; Jackman, R., 1991, Unemployment: Macroeconomic
performance and the labour market, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ljungqvist, L., Sargent, T.J., 1998, The European unemployment dilemma,
Journal of Political Economy 106, 514-550.
Ljungqvist, L., Sargent, T.J., 2008, Two questions about European unem-
ployment, Econometrica 76(1), 1-29.
Lockwood, B., 1991, Information externalities in the labour market and the
duration of unemployment, Review of Economic Studies 58, 733-753.
Machin, S.; Manning, A., 1999, The Causes and consequences of longterm
unemployment in Europe, in: O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds),
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3c, 3085-3139.
Nickell, S.J., 1979, Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment,
Econometrica 47, 1249-1265.
Nickell, S.J.; Nunziata, L., 2002, Labour Market Institutions Database,
version 2, Centre for Economic Performance.
Nickell, S.J.; Nunziata, L.; Ochel, W., 2005, Unemployment in the OECD
since the 1960s: What do we Know?, Economic Journal 115, 1-27.
25OECD Online Database, http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/0,2639,en_2825
_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C. A., 2001, Looking into the black box:
A survey of the matching function, Journal of Economic Literature
39(2), 390 - 431.
Phelps, E.S., 1972, The statistical theory of racism and sexism, American
Economic Review 62, 659-661.
Pissarides, C. A., 1992, Loss of skill during unemployment and the per-
sistence of employment shocks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107,
1371-1391.
Pissarides, C. A., 2000, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd edition,
MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Rhum, C.J., 1991, Are workers permanently scarred by job displacements?,
American Economic Review 81, 319-324.
Rłed, K., Zhang, T., 2003, Does unemployment compensation a⁄ect un-
employment duration?, Economic Journal 113, 190-206.
Shimer, R., 2005, The Cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and
vacancies, American Economic Review 95(1), 25-49.
Sider, H. 1985, Unemployment duration and incidence: 1968-82, American
Economic Review 75, 461-472.
Sin￿eld, A., 1981, What Unemployment Means, Oxford, Martin Robertson.
Van den Berg, G.J., 1990, Nonstationarity in job search theory, Review of
Economic Studies 57, 255-277.
Van den Berg, G.J., van der Klaauw, B., 2001, Combining micro and macro
unemployment duration data, Journal of Econometrics 102, 271-309.
Van den Berg, G.J., van Ours, J.C., 1994, Unemployment dynamics and
duration dependence in France, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom, Economic Journal 104, 432-443.
van Ours, J.C., VodopivecM., 2006, How shortening the potential duration
of unemployment bene￿ts a⁄ects the duration of unemployment: Ev-
idence from a natural experiment, Journal of Labor Economics 24(2),
351-378.
Vishwanath, T., 1989, Job search, stigma e⁄ect, and escape rate from
unemployment, Journal of Labor Economics 7, 487-502.
26Webster, D., 2005, Long-Term unemployment, the Invention of "hystere-
sis" and the misdiagnosis of structural unemployment in the UK, Cam-




















































































































































































































Figure 1: Unemployment rates, estimated unemployment rates, and hypo-
thetical unemployment rates
28Table 3: Complete regression results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sS -0.030z -0.015z -0.021z -0.011z -0.024z -0.012z
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
sM -0.015z 0.015z -0.011z 0.011z -0.012z 0.012z
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
sL 0.015z 0.030z 0.011z 0.021z 0.012z 0.024z
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
brr 1.005y 1.005y 1.005y -0.341 -0.341 -0.341 -1.060z -1.060z -1.060z
(0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.276) (0.276) (0.276)
bd 1.225z 1.225z 1.225z 0.625z 0.625z 0.625z 0.239 0.239 0.239
(0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.400) (0.400) (0.400)
ep -0.793z -0.793z -0.793z 0.027 0.027 0.027 -1.460y -1.460y -1.460y
(0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.604) (0.604) (0.604)
ud 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.050 0.050 0.050 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029
(1.093) (1.093) (1.093) (0.524) (0.524) (0.524) (0.694) (0.694) (0.694)
co -0.171] -0.171] -0.171] -1.143z -1.143z -1.143z -1.536z -1.536z -1.536z
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305)
tts 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.148 0.148 0.148
(1.017) (1.017) (1.017) (0.449) (0.449) (0.449) (0.488) (0.488) (0.488)
lds -1.559 -1.559 -1.559 -1.484z -1.484z -1.484z -1.625z -1.625z -1.625z
(1.314) (1.314) (1.314) (0.491) (0.491) (0.491) (0.645) (0.645) (0.645)
tfp -3.757z -3.757z -3.757z -2.795z -2.795z -2.795z -3.682z -3.682z -3.682z
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.682) (0.682) (0.682) (0.653) (0.653) (0.653)
r 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.486 0.486 0.486 0.041 0.041 0.041
(0.537) (0.537) (0.537) (0.445) (0.445) (0.445) (0.414) (0.414) (0.414)
log(v) -0.163z -0.163z -0.163z -0.252z -0.252z -0.252z -0.231z -0.231z -0.231z
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Notes: dependent variable: log of unemployment rate; sS: share of short-term unemployed; sM: share
of medium-term unemployed; sL: share of long-term unemployed; brr: bene￿t replacement rate; bd:
bene￿t duration; ud: ￿rst di⁄erence of net union density; co: coordination of bargaining ; tts: Terms
of Trade shocks; lds: labor demand shocks; tfp: total factor productivity; r: real interest rate; v:
vacancy rate; z: signi￿cant at the 1% level; y: signi￿cant at the 5% level; ]: signi￿cant at the 10%
level; standard error in parenthesis.
29Table 4: Complete regression results (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
R2 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.982 0.982 0.982
FE X X X X X X X X X
TE X X X
AT X X X
CT X X X
AR X X X X X X
W 84.72z 84.72z 84.72z 224.10z 224.10z 224.10z 168.82z 168.82z 168.82z
LLC -7.899z -7.899z -7.899z -12.06z -12.06z -12.06z -12.87z -12.87z -12.87z
ADF 107.1z 107.1z 107.1z 189.6z 189.6z 189.6z 190.2z 190.2z 190.2z
N 258 258 258 242 242 242 242 242 242
Notes: FE: ￿xed e⁄ects; TE: time e⁄ects; AT: aggregated time trend; CT: country time trend;
AR: ￿rst order autoregressive term; W: Wald test (Chi-square) for the null hypothesis sj= sk; LLC:
Levin, Lin & Chu t* (null hypothesis: common unit root process); ADF: ADF - Fisher Chi-square
(null hypothesis: individual unit root process) N: number of observations; z: signi￿cant at the 1%
level; standard error in parenthesis.
30